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Abstract
This chapter presents a conflict risk assessment based framework for airspace 
planning and design developed for the purpose of preventing aircraft conflicts and 
collisions. During airspace planning and design process, airspace designers are often 
guided by the need to increase capacity and/or reduce air traffic controller (ATCo) 
workload. In order to consider safety risks in a systematic way, the proposed frame-
work contains an additional step—safety risk assessment, performed by safety ana-
lysts guided by the risk reduction need. In such a way, they are providing feedback 
to airspace designers regarding safety issues of their solutions. This chapter presents 
four conflict risk assessment models, each one developed for different airspace 
planning level (strategic, tactical, operational, and current day) contained in the 
proposed framework. Basic development principles for every model were explained 
together with specific objectives, assumptions, conflict risk concepts, and required 
input data. Models are illustrated by the simple numerical examples.
Keywords: conflict risk assessment, airspace planning, airspace design,  
air traffic control, aviation safety
1. Introduction
Air traffic is growing with an average annual rate of about 4–5% in the last 
30 years [1, 2]. The increase of the air traffic volume in Europe up to 2050 is fore-
casted in the European Commission (EC) document “Flightpath 2050” [2] to be 
almost a threefold relative to the year 2011 (25 million commercial flights in 2050 
relative to 9.4 million expected in 2011), i.e., with an expected average annual rate 
of about 4%. Also, an increase of 25% in aircraft operations is predicted up to 2039 
relative to 2019 in the USA [3], i.e., 1,25% annually in average. Simultaneously, an 
increased level of safety is required [2].
In order to accommodate such a growth, a development of new air traffic 
operational concepts is expected [4]. But accommodation of growing traffic with 
requirement to increase safety presents a significant challenge for the research and 
scientific community since an increase of traffic should not lead to a decrease in 
safety. That is why a development of new safety measures and system safety perfor-
mance indicators is also expected [4].
The air traffic system is a complex, socio-technical, safety-critical, and dynamic 
system with three main components at macro level—airlines, airports, and air traf-
fic control/management services. Those components mutually interact at different 
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hierarchical levels. At microlevel air traffic system presents a very complicated, 
highly distributed network of human operators, procedures, and technical/techno-
logical systems within different operational environments. Safety of flight opera-
tions in such a complex system is influenced by interactions between the various 
components and elements [5, 6]. Airports and the air traffic control/air traffic man-
agement (ATC/ATM) system as an air traffic system infrastructure are expected to 
be able to support such growth safely and efficiently with adequate capacity.
The research presented in this chapter is focused on the ATC/ATM system and 
more specifically on airspace planning, design, and organization.
An airspace as main infrastructure resource of ATC/ATM system is characterized 
by the capacity, which is usually given as the maximum number of aircraft passing 
through a given airspace in a given time period [7]. Capacity depends on the air traffic 
flows and the aircraft separation minima applied. One of the possibilities to increase 
airspace capacity is to reduce the separation minima [8]. This approach is driven by 
the fact that suitable communication, navigation, and surveillance technology (COM/
NAV/SUR) already exist [9]. The reduction of separation minima could increase the 
traffic throughput but also could affect the safety of the flight operations. This is the 
reason for the development of models for safety assessment of such a change and for 
balancing between an increase in capacity and any possible decrease in safety.
The main objective of the research described in this chapter is the development 
of a framework for airspace planning and design based on a conflict risk assess-
ment. The main purpose of such a framework should be prevention of aircraft 
conflicts and collisions.
To enable implementation of the proposed framework, it was necessary to 
develop a risk assessment model for airspace planning, design, and organization 
purposes at the strategic, tactical, operational, and current day planning levels.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of different 
risk modeling approaches in air traffic system. Section 3 describes the proposed 
framework. Section 4 explains the development of a conflict risk assessment model 
for strategic, tactical, operational, and current day planning levels as well as illus-
trates their application. Finally, Section 5 draws conclusions and presents further 
research directions.
2. Risk modeling approaches
2.1 Overview of risk modeling approaches
The main concern in the daily operation of ATC system is prevention of conflicts 
between aircraft either while airborne or on the ground, which could possibly 
become a collision [5, 6].
The main reason for developing risk models since the 1960s was the need for 
increasing airspace capacity (in order to accommodate growing traffic demand) 
by reducing both space and time aircraft separation minima. However, due to the 
reduction of this separation, an air traffic safety could be jeopardized. That is why 
an assessment of the risk of conflicts and collisions has been studied using different 
models. It was expected from using those models to show whether a reduction of 
separation would be sufficiently safe. The following models were in use [5, 6]:
• The Reich-Marks model was developed in the early 1960s [10]. It is based on the 
assumption that both aircraft positions and speeds are random variables. The  
model computed the probability of aircraft proximity and the conditional prob-
ability of collision given the proximity [11, 12].
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• The Machol-Reich model was developed in 1966 with the idea of develop-
ing the Reich-Marks model as a workable tool, as well as to increase airspace 
capacity over Atlantic. Consequently, the ICAO adopted the threshold for risk 
of collision of two aircraft due to the loss of separation [11, 13].
• Intersection models are simplest among collision risk models. They assume that 
aircraft follow predetermined crossing trajectories at constant speeds. Using the 
intensities of traffic flows on each crossing trajectory, aircraft speeds, and airways 
geometry, the probability of collision at the crossing point is computed [14–18].
• Geometric conflict models are similar to intersection models. They are devel-
oped in the 1990s with the main assumption that aircraft speed is constant, but 
their initial three-dimensional positions are random. The conflict occurs when 
two aircraft are closer than the prescribed separation minimum [19–23].
• The generalized Reich model was developed during the 1990s by removing 
restrictive assumptions from the Reich model [9, 24–27].
Collision risk models have gradually been developed since the 1960s, but their 
main purpose has always been to support decision-making processes during system 
planning and development.
2.2 ICAO risk modeling approach
The ICAO has developed the collision risk model (CRM) as a mathematical tool 
used in predicting the risk of mid-air collision [28–30]. The CRM model became 
a crucial part of the Airspace Planning Methodology for the determination of 
separation criteria [28] which purpose is to determine separation minima based on 
calculated collision probability.
CRM calculates probability of collision as the lateral or vertical overlap prob-
ability, given the probability density functions of position errors at a given moment 
[31, 32]. However, [33, 34] CRM is not able to model all situations, especially 
operational errors.
2.3 Conflict vs. collision risk modeling
What is a conflict? A conflict is an operational situation in which two (or some-
times more) aircraft come closer to each other than a specified separation minimum 
distance (both in the horizontal and the vertical planes). In order to detect conflict 
situation, a cylinder-shaped “forbidden volume” [35] (“protected zone” [22] or 
“conflict cylinder” [34]) is defined around the aircraft. The dimensions of this 
volume are defined by the minimum horizontal Smin (cylinder radius) and vertical 
Hmin separation (cylinder height). Whenever one aircraft enters the other’s forbid-
den volume (Figure 1), a potential conflict situation occurs. Conflicts could be 
of different types—crossing or overtaking—depending on the relations between 
aircraft trajectories both in horizontal and vertical planes [35].
What are collisions? Collisions are defined by forbidden volumes which are 
much smaller than in the case of conflicts (Figure 1). The dimensions of those 
volumes are defined by the size of the aircraft [10, 16, 30].
As already mentioned, one of the principal matters of concern in the daily 
operation of ATC system is the prevention of conflicts between aircraft (inci-
dents) either while airborne or on the ground, which might escalate to collisions 
(accidents).
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3.  Conflict risk assessment based framework for airspace planning  
and design
The basic idea of the proposed framework is that different risk assessment 
models are required for different planning levels in ATC/ATM system [35, 36]. 
Their main purpose of those models is to support decision-making during airspace 
planning and design process through evaluation of safety risks of proposed changes 
(either in the existing or the new system).
Generally, airspace designers are often guided by the need to increase capacity 
and/or reduce air traffic controller (ATCo) workload, during planning and design 
process. Usually, the safety risk assessment is not explicitly performed, but in order 
to consider safety risks in a systematic way (explicitly), the proposed framework 
contains an additional step. In this step a safety risk assessment is performed by 
safety analysts driven by the risk reduction need (Figure 2). Safety analysts in such 
a way are providing feedback (both positive and negative) to airspace designers 
regarding safety issues of their solutions [9]. It is important for provision of objec-
tive feedback that safety analysts are independent of airspace designers.
A proposed conflict risk assessment modeling framework contains four plan-
ning levels (strategic, tactical, operational, and current day). It is developed to be 
complementary to ICAO CRMs and not as its replacement. The main differences 
between proposed framework and ICAO CRM are the following [37]:
• They are considering different events: the proposed framework considers risk 
of conflict (incidents) while CRM considers risk of collision (accidents);
• They are used for different purposes: the proposed framework considers 
airspace designs based on conflict risk, while CRM uses collision risk for 
determination of separation minima which further allow increase of airspace 
capacity.
Figure 1. 
Conflicts vs. collision forbidden volumes.
Figure 2. 
Iterative process for airspace design and planning (compiled from [9]).
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• They use protection volumes of different sizes: the proposed framework con-
siders the forbidden volume around aircraft, while CRM considers the physical 
dimensions of aircraft.
• They use different separation minima types: the proposed framework uses 
distance-based separation minima only, while CRM uses both distance- and 
time-based.
• The resulting risk values are not the same: the conflict risk value is always 
bigger then collision risk value due to the fact that conflicts are more frequent 
than collisions.
The proposed framework is intended for use by the safety analysts (as presented in 
Figure 2). For each of the four planning levels, the necessary (not exhaustive) inputs 
are listed, and possible types of models are proposed (Figure 3, Table 1 [35, 36]).
From Figure 3 it can be seen that proposed framework is sequential in nature, 
meaning that outputs obtained after the application of conflict risk assessment 
models at one planning level are used as inputs into another planning level.
Starting from the initial larger set of scenarios, applying the suitable conflict risk 
assessment models, a gradually reduced set of scenarios (positively evaluated from 
the safety point of view) is obtained as outputs from the model application [37]:
• The output at strategic planning level is a list of airspace scenarios A1,…, An 
chosen to be used on the tactical planning level.
• The output at tactical level is a list of airspace scenarios B1,…, Bm (m < n from the 
strategic planning level) chosen to be used on the operational planning level.
Figure 3. 
Planning levels in conflict risk assessment modeling framework (based on [35–37]).
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• The output at operational level is a list of airspace scenarios C1,…, Ck (k < m from 
the tactical planning level) chosen to be used in current day operation.
At the current day level, risk assessment model should help decision-makers to 
timely organize sectorization based on a given list of sectors and confirmed flight plans.
Table 1. 
Inputs for conflict risk assessment vs. planning levels.
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It is evident from Table 1 that moving closer to the current day planning level, 
safety risk assessment models become more detailed and complex. Actually, the 
level of abstraction is getting smaller due to availability of specific information, 
while their nature also changes (from analytical models to simulation models and 
further to decision support systems).
In the following text, a framework is described separately through the developed 
conflict risk assessment models for each planning level as well as illustration of their 
application.
(compiled from [35–37]).
4. Conflict risk assessment models
All conflict risk assessment models developed under the proposed framework 
are sharing the few general characteristics [37]:
1. The main starting point is that the risk depends on airspace geometry (static 
element) and the air traffic using it (dynamic element).
2. All models are based on the concept of critical sections, as part of the aircraft 
trajectory, which are traversed by the aircraft during level flight or while climb-
ing or descending through these sections. A critical section was defined as 
portion of trajectory j in which aircraft should not be at the same time, if other 
aircraft is in intersection point O flying on trajectory i, in order to prevent oc-
currence of conflict (similarly is in the case of flying on the same trajectory).
3. A conflict is defined as a situation in which two aircraft are coming closer than 
a separation minimum distance (both in horizontal and vertical planes).
4. In order to detect conflict situations, around the aircraft a cylinder-shaped 
forbidden volume (protected zone) is defined (its dimensions are defined by 
the minimum horizontal Smin and vertical separation Hmin).
5. The following assumptions are introduced in developing the models for risk 
assessment:
• Risk is antonym for safety.
• If there is no traffic, there is no risk.
• Risk values are not constant.
• Risk values usually positively correlate to traffic demand and negatively to 
airspace volume.
6. All models, under certain conditions, could be applied both for en route and 
terminal maneuvering (TMA) airspace.
7. The risk values calculated using the developed models are only the relative 
measure of safety. This means that there are intended for the purpose of com-
parison between numerous scenarios, not for comparison with a Target Level 
of Safety (TLS) given by the international regulations [38–40].
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4.1 Conflict risk assessment model for airspace strategic planning
4.1.1 Objectives and assumptions
The conflict risk assessment model for the airspace strategic planning level 
[35, 37] is intended to facilitate comparisons and sensitivity analyses of different 
airspace designs (sector shapes) and organizational scenarios (sector configura-
tions) under different air traffic flow levels a year or more in advance. Conflict risk 
is assessed using two variables [35, 37]: the conflict probability and the number of 
conflicts in the given airspace under the given circumstances.
In order to detect conflicts, length and flying time through critical section (criti-
cal length and critical time) are defined. Those two values enable calculation of the 
conflict probability, which is (for a given pair of aircraft) defined as the product of 
the probability that an aircraft is in a given critical section of its own trajectory and 
the conditional probability that another aircraft is simultaneously in a corresponding 
critical section of its (crossing) trajectory. The number of conflicts is defined as the 
product of conflict probability and estimated traffic flows for the given airway [35, 37].
Taking into account all available flight levels and airway combinations in the 
given airspace, it is possible to calculate total conflict numbers. Details of the model 
development are provided in [35, 37].
Proposed conflict risk assessment model is intended for airspace planning 
purposes at the strategic level, based on risk assessment of the current, and 
future airspace, following its modifications (changes of sector shapes or sector 
configurations).
The main inputs for conflict risk assessment using the proposed model are [35, 37]:
• Airspace geometry and characteristics (sector shape/boundaries, number and 
spatial distribution of available airways, length of the airways, number of 
intersecting points, available flight levels, etc.)
• Traffic characteristics (special and temporal distribution of traffic flows, 
proportion of level flights (in cruising phase) vs. flights in climb/descent, share 
of specific aircraft category in total traffic volume, etc.)
Human operator (pilots and ATCos) issues and behaviors are not considered.
4.1.2 Illustration of the model application
In order to illustrate the developed model, a hypothetic en route sector is used 
containing two unidirectional airways, one bidirectional airway, and four flight 
levels (Figure 4).
In this example traffic flow increase (e.g., on AWY3) as well as airspace volume 
change (e.g., length extension of AWY3) was considered together with the change 
in separation minima applied. Details of the model application illustration are 
provided in [35].
Experimental results show the following:
• Higher risk of conflict can be obtained in the case of traffic demand increase in 
airspace volume that does not change (sector volume and airway length, Figure 5).
• Decrease in risk of conflict can be obtained in the case of an increase of 
airspace volume (sector volumes and airway lengths), with traffic demand that 
does not change (Figure 6).
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Figure 4. 
Sector geometry (compiled from [35, 37]).
Figure 5. 
Risk for the given sector dependent on traffic flow on AWY3 [35, 37].
Figure 6. 
Risk for the given sector dependent on length of AWY3 (change of sector volume) [35, 37].
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• Reduction of separation minima is causing higher conflict risk values (Figures 5 
and 6).
4.2 Conflict risk assessment model for airspace tactical planning
4.2.1 Objectives and assumptions
The conflict risk assessment model for airspace tactical planning level is 
intended for evaluation and comparison of different alternative flight scheduling 
scenarios for a given airspace sectorization, or comparison of different alternative 
airspace sectorization scenarios for a given flight schedule, from 1 week up to a 
season in advance [36, 37].
Assessment of conflict risk is based on two variables [36, 37]: duration and 
severity of conflict situation in the given airspace. Both, duration and severity, 
depend on different factors: aircraft entry time into given airspace, aircraft speed, 
relative speed between conflicting aircraft, trajectory crossing angle, separation 
minima, etc. The conflict risk is defined as the ratio between the “elementary 
risk” and the observed period of time. “Elementary risk” is calculated as the ratio 
between [36, 37] (1) the surface limited by minimum separation line (from above) 
and function representing the change of conflicting aircraft separation (from 
below) and the surface limited by minimum separation and time moments pre-
senting the conflict duration (beginning and ending of conflict) and (2) abscissa. 
Conflict risk is being calculated for each aircraft pair, as well as for all conflicting 
pairs, i.e., total conflict risk in the given airspace. Details of the model are provided 
in [36, 37]. The proposed conflict risk model is intended for [36, 37]:
• Assessment of conflict risk in given airspace under given flight schedules
• Approval of filed flight plans or suggestions for their modifications (flight 
re-scheduling or slot assignments with the aim to reduce conflict risk)
The main inputs for conflict risk assessment using this model are [36, 37]:
• Known airspace geometry and characteristics (e.g., sector shape/boundar-
ies, number and length of the airways, airway tracks, number of intersecting 
points, available flight levels, etc.)
• Known traffic demand characteristics (flight plans—planned routes, speeds, 
altitudes, aircraft types, temporal and spatial distribution of air traffic flows 
over specific airspace entry points, etc.)
The main assumption of this model is that flight perfectly follows their planned 
routes (trajectories) and altitudes. Also, human operator (pilots and ATCos) issues 
and behaviors are not considered.
4.2.2 Illustration of the model application
In order to illustrate the developed model, a hypothetic en route sector is consid-
ered containing two unidirectional airways and one flight level (Figure 7).
For illustration purposes only, flights on one flight level are considered. Five flights 
entering the sector in a 6-minute period are considered (Figures 8–10). For each 
flight, an entry time, together with aircraft type and assigned airway, was the input.
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Potential traffic separation violations in the horizontal plane between succeed-
ing aircraft pairs are observed in the simulated situations for the case of separation 
minima of Smin = 10 NM (only intersecting conflicts are presented (shaded areas in 
Figure 8)). The calculated total risk was 3.08∙10−3.
In order to examine the influence of changes in flight entry time on the indi-
vidual and total risk values, a simple change is introduced.
Namely, allowing one flight to enter into the system 30 seconds earlier (red line, 
Figure 9), the total risk value is reduced from 3.08∙10−3 to 2.86∙10−3.
Additionally, a previous situation is simulated with a lower separation minima 
Smin = 5 NM resulting in lower total risk. The risk value is now reduced from 
2.86∙10−3 to 1.39∙10−3 (Figure 10). Details of the model application illustration are 
provided in [36, 37].
Figure 7. 
Sector geometry with flights (compiled from [36, 37], xikh,t is horizontal separation between flights i and k at 
time t).
Figure 8. 
Change of spacing between aircraft pairs and the potential conflicts in the horizontal plane (Smin = 10 NM), 
compiled from [36, 37].
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4.3 Conflict risk assessment model for airspace operational planning
The conflict risk assessment model for airspace operational planning level is 
intended for evaluation and comparison of different alternative operational sce-
narios (different separation minima, delegation of responsibility between pilots and 
ATCos, introduction of different ground and/or airborne-based decision support 
systems and tools, etc.) one or more days in advance [37].
In order to assess conflict risk, two variables are used [37]: duration of single or 
all conflict situations and severity of conflict situations.
The main inputs for this model are [37]:
• Airspace geometry
• Characteristics of the COM/NAV/SUR system equipment (technical character-
istics and reliability)
• Actual traffic data (aircraft types, entry time in the airspace, exit time from  
the airspace)
Figure 9. 
Change of spacing between aircraft pairs and the potential conflicts in the horizontal plane (Smin = 10 NM) 
with modified entry time case, compiled from [36, 37].
Figure 10. 
Change of spacing between aircraft pairs and the potential conflicts in the horizontal plane (Smin = 5 NM), 
compiled from [36, 37].
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• Data on aircraft behavior during the flight, reliability of certain aircraft techni-
cal parts, etc.
The influence of human operators (pilots, ATCos, etc.) at this level is considered 
through the modeling of their state (situational awareness, workload, etc.) [37].
An example of conflict risk assessment model for airspace operational planning 
level (one or more days in advance) is presented in the work of [41–43]. Although 
those papers are not directly related to the developed framework, they are showing 
the type of models which could be used for risk assessment at operational planning 
level. The goals of the research described in those papers were to assess the potential 
collision risk reduction for a historical en route mid-air collision event by using 
traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS).
This model (Figure 11) contains the technical elements (Cockpit Display of 
Traffic Information (CDTI), speakers for aural annunciation, TCAS, Mode S 
airborne-airborne communication link, airborne-ground communication link 
(COM)), human elements (pilot crews and ATCos), and procedural elements of 
TCAS operations (change of ATCos and pilots’ roles during TCAS encounters) and 
fully supports mathematical analysis as well as rare event agent-based Monte Carlo 
simulation of aircraft encounters [43].
4.4 Conflict risk assessment model for airspace current day planning
4.4.1 Objectives and assumptions
A final step of the proposed framework is presented by the conflict risk assess-
ment model for airspace current day planning level [37, 44].
The main objective (purpose) of this model is to support decision-making 
processes during sectorization (for a given set of available elementary sectors deter-
mined at operational planning level) through evaluation of the number of conflicts, 
the conflict probability, and the risk of conflict as well as their distribution at inter-
sections or along airways, and ATCo task-load according to the approach of [45] for 
a given airspace and traffic load [44], few hours in advance. Decision-makers, using 
the proposed model and the results obtained, could decide whether or not to accept 
the estimated risk with a certain specified probability as well as the estimated 
task-load. Based on these results, they could decide, in advance, to keep the existing 
sectorization or not, at current day level [37, 44].
Figure 11. 
High-level representation of TCAS agents [37, 43].
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The following input data are used in this model [37, 44]:
• Known traffic data (confirmed flight plans and flight schedules with known 
aircraft types)
• Known airspace geometry (sector shapes and boundaries, number and length 
of airways, as well as airway tracks) determined as the most appropriate from a 
conflict risk point of view at the operational level
The influence of humans is considered through the ATCo task-load. Details of 
the model are provided in [37, 44].
Apart from the main assumptions, an additional one is introduced here: risk is 
a random variable and one aircraft at an airway can be simultaneously in conflict 
with only one aircraft from another airway.
The objectives and assumptions of this model show that the main difference 
between this model and models presented in previous subsections [35, 36] is that 
risk is assumed to be random variable and that consequently the developed conflict 
risk assessment model should now be able to serve as a decision support tool.
4.4.2 Illustration of the model application
In order to illustrate the developed model, a hypothetic en route sector is used 
(Figure 4). For each flight the following inputs were used: the entry points into the 
airspace, entry time, entry flight level, heading, ground, and vertical speed. Values 
for those inputs were assumed to remain constant during the flight [37, 44].
In real operations, the decision on specific sectorization usage in a certain time 
period is based solely on the forecasted number of aircraft in the sector. But, other 
factors exist as well, one of which is the number of potential conflicts. This number 
indicates an ATCo task-load and conflict risk in the sector. Correct assessment of 
those indicators is the responsibility of air traffic managers, and it serves them to 
adjust the existing airspace capacity by changing the sector configuration [37, 44].
Figure 12. 
Example showing possible usage of outcomes of developed model by the air traffic managers [37, 44].
15
Conflict Risk Assessment Based Framework for Airspace Planning and Design
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89862
Based on the values for the number of conflicts, the risk of conflict, the risk 
probability, and the task-load determined by the simulation, their possible usage by 
air traffic managers is explained.
Let the number of conflict Nc* = 7, with a horizontal separation minima of 
10 NM and 12 aircraft/hour on AWY3. Figure 12 (upper left) enables the deter-
mination of a frequency (probability) of seven conflicts (23%), while Figure 12 
(upper right) enables the determination of ATCo task-load of 63%. This task-load 
value could be compared with critical threshold values which are usually used to 
define an overload situation [37, 44]. A conflict risk value of R* ≈ 6.6 • 10−1 was read 
from Figure 12 (lower left) for given Nc*, while Figure 12 (lower right), for a risk 
value R ≤ R*, shows a cumulative probability of 0.71.
Figure 12 presents a value which could serve air traffic managers to decide 
whether or not a specific merging or partitioning of sectors is necessary within a 
certain time period (e.g., 30–90 minutes), allowing them in such a way to perform 
real-time analysis on a regular basis (e.g., every half an hour) [37, 44].
5. Conclusion
This chapter presents a framework for airspace planning and design based on 
conflict risk assessment developed for the purpose of preventing aircraft conflicts 
and collisions. The proposed framework is hierarchical by nature, containing four 
planning levels: strategic, tactical, operational, and current day.
During airspace planning and design process, airspace designers are often 
guided by the need to increase capacity and/or reduce air traffic controller (ATCo) 
workload. In order to consider safety risks in a systematic way, the proposed 
framework contains an additional step—safety risk assessment performed by 
safety analysts guided by the risk reduction need. In such a way, they are providing 
feedback to airspace designers regarding safety issues of their solutions.
This chapter presents four conflict risk assessment models, each one for dif-
ferent airspace planning level (strategic, tactical, operational, and current day), 
contained in the proposed framework.
Each of those models defines conflict risk on a different way and also has differ-
ent objectives. The idea behind every model, i.e., basic development principles, was 
explained together with specific objectives, assumptions, and conflict risk concepts.
All models are illustrated by the simple numerical examples. The illustration of 
the model application shows that in addition to airspace geometry (airways length 
and airways crossing angles), conflict risk in the given airspace also depends on 
traffic flows/traffic demand, average flow speeds/aircraft speed, average aircraft 
inter-arrival times, spatial and temporal distribution of aircraft in the airspace, as 
well as separation minima in horizontal plane.
Experimental results confirmed that conflict risk values are sensitive on traffic 
demand and airspace volume changes.
A plan for further research considers application of the proposed framework in 
real-life systems and on large-scale cases. Special attention will be given to investi-
gation of air traffic managers’ behavior during decision-making process.
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